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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the seller-optimal auctions for auction design 
environments with pure informational externalities, and investigate the effects of 
outside options on auction outcomes. If the seller's outside option is endogenous and 
depends on the information structure of the market, we show that the seller sells the 
good more often as the auction design environment merges into the standard private-
value auction setting. If the seller's outside option does not depend on the information 
structure of the market, we show that the relationship between the degree of 
informational externalities and sale decisions in seller-optimal auctions is ambiguous. 
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1. Introduction 
This study first presents the robust methodology to construct seller-
optimal auctions for  the auction design problems with pure informational 
externalities, and then analyzes the effects of outside options’ structure on 
the seller-optimal auction outcomes. In these environments, each buyer's 
valuation for an auctioned good has two components: a private value 
component, and a common value component. The private value component 
depends only on each agent’s own private information, and the common 
value component depends on the other agents' private information as well. 
The seller's valuation for the auctioned good also depends on buyers’ private 
information for our first case. That is, all agents have private information, 
which is not completely informative, about the real value of the auctioned 
good. This is to say that preferences are informationally interdependent. One 
example of such environments is FCC spectrum auctions where bidders 
formed their valuations for a given spectrum based on the beliefs of the 
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other bidders, see Cramton (1997) for more on spectrum auctions conducted 
by Federal Communications Commission, an independent U.S. government 
agency. Other examples are take-overs, oil-drilling rights, timber auctions, 
art auctions, and treasury bill auctions, see for example Klemperer (1999) 
for more on these different auction environments. In this framework, we 
describe the set of seller-optimal auctions, and examine the relationship 
among auction outcomes, outside options, and the degree of informational 
externalities. Our contribution is to show that the correlation between the 
degree of informational externalities and sale decisions depends on different 
specifications of the seller's outside option. 
In the mechanism design literature, the optimal auction design 
problem with or without externalities has been studied in many papers for 
different environments under different assumptions. Myerson (1981) 
provides a characterization of seller-optimal or revenue maximizing auctions 
in private-value settings. See also Bulow and Roberts (1989) for a simple 
way to characterize the optimal auctions. Levin (1997) extends this 
characterization to multi-unit auction environments with complementaries 
among the units. We also use similar tools of mechanism design to define 
the set of seller-optimal auctions with informational externalities. Our paper 
is also closely related to the literature on auction design with externalities. 
See, e.g., Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996), Jehiel, Moldovanu, and 
Stacchetti (1999), Das Varma (2002), Goeree (2003), Maasland and 
Onderstal (2007), Aseff and Chade (2008),  and Lu (2012). In most of these 
papers, the basic idea is that all market participants or bidders other than the 
seller are influenced by the identity of the auction winner and/or the sale 
price. There are mainly two different types of externalities: (i) allocative 
externalities, and (ii) informational externalities. In our paper, we do not 
assume allocative externalities among buyers, but we have a simple structure 
of informational externality in which the real value of the auctioned good 
depends on the private information of all participants in a given market. 
Unlike the above mentioned papers, we assume that the seller also has value 
for the auctioned item (her outside option is endogenous and hence not 
normalized to a constant), and her valuation also depends on the information 
structure of the economy for our first case. For our second case, we assume 
that the seller’s outside option is exogenous and normalized to a constant. 
We try to observe the relationship among these two different specifications 
of the seller’s outside option, optimal auction outcomes, and the degree of 
informational externalities. Among others, Brocas (2007), Figueroa and 
Skreta (2009), Chen and Potipiti (2010), Figueroa and Skreta (2011), and 
Brocas (2013) also analyze revenue maximizing auctions with externalities, 
and examine the effects of  identity dependent outside options on revenue 
maximizing auctions for different auction design environments. The main 
focus of these papers is on the buyers' outside options rather than the sellers' 




outside options. Moreover, identity dependent externalities or allocative 
externalities are not present in our current paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We present the 
auction design environment and introduce the notation in the next section. 
Section 3 provides the results for the derivation of seller-optimal auctions. 
Section 4 provides numerical examples of our main characterization to 
provide an intuition for our main result and to highlight the effects of outside 
options. Finally, we summarize the findings of the paper in Section 5. 
2. The model 
We follow the standard notation and presentation to describe the 
auction design environment. We refer the reader to Krishna (2009) for more 
details about the environment and notation. There is a risk-neutral seller, s, 
who owns an indivisible item, and there are 2n  risk-neutral potential 
buyers. The set of all buyers or bidders is denoted by the set {1,..., }B n . 
Each agent receives a private signal [ , ]i i i i , where each signal is 
a random variable with a cumulative distribution function ( )i iF , and a 
density function ( )i if  which is positive and bounded for all i . A 
nonmonetary auction outcome is a vector 1( , ,..., )s nx x x x  such that ix  is 




x . We denote the set of 
all possible outcomes by X . 
Each buyer i B has a quasilinear utility function such that 
{ }( , , ) (( ) (1 )) .
1
j
j B si i i i i i i iu x t x v t x t
n
        (1) 
For our first case, the seller also has a quasilinear utility function such that, 




j B ss s s s s s s su x t x v t x t
n
       (2) 
The constant (0,1)  is a weight assigned to each agents’ private 
information;  is an private signal profile or an information structure of the 
market; it is a payment made by a buyer i B , and st is the payment 
received by the seller. More general preferences that are non-linear in 
possible auction outcomes, and these types of more structured preferences 
are also used in Küçükşenel (2012a) to provide comparative statics results 
about the whole set of interim efficient auction mechanisms. Even though 
this type of utility functions can be restrictive for some settings, it is one of 
the most intuitive way to represent the main idea of informational 
externalities. For these preferences, an agent's real value for the auctioned 
good, ( )iv , depends on a private value component, her private signal, i , 
and a common value component, average information of all agents in the 










. Two extreme cases, 0  (pure common-value 
auction setting) and 1  (private-value auction setting), are well studied in 
the auction design literature. We name  as the degree of informational 
externalities in the rest of the paper. For the second case, we assume that the 
seller has no valuation for the item; that is, ( )sv =0. For these two different 
cases, we analyze the relationship among the seller-optimal auction 
outcomes, outside options, and the degree of informational externalities. 
The auction design problem is to choose an auction mechanism ( , )y t  
such that an auction outcome rule, :y X , specifies who gets the item, 
and a payment rule, { }: B st , defines a payment for each buyer, and 
the total amount that the seller receives. As it is standard in the mechanism 
design literature, we are concentrating on direct mechanisms in which the 
set of announced types is equivalent to the set of possible types in the rest of 
the paper.2 By the revelation principle, we can study these simple incentive 
compatible, direct auction mechanisms without loss of generality (Myerson, 
1981). Note that for other environments where the seller has private 
information or signal and also chooses an auction mechanism to implement, 
this result, revelation principle, may not be true. The seller may want to 
signal her private information by offering different auction mechanisms.3 It 
is beyond the scope of our current paper to analyze this type of more 
demanding problems. In our setting, the only difference between the seller 
and a buyer is their outside options. In a sense, an outside agent, mechanism 
designer or planner, offers a trade mechanism for these agents to use for 
exchanging the item.   
We now introduce three standard axioms (incentive compatibility, 
individual rationality, and budget balance) that auction mechanisms may 
satisfy in our auction design environment. See surveys on the mechanism 
design literature by Jackson (2003) and by Myerson (2008) for more details 
about these axioms.  
An auction mechanism, ( , )y t , is interim incentive compatible if for 
all { }i B s , and all ,i i i  
( ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , ), ) ( )
i
i i i i i i i i i i i i iU U u y t dF ,     (3) 
where ( , )i i iU  is agent i's expected utility when he reports that his type is 
ii  given that his private information or actual type is i . An auction 
mechanism, ( , )y t , is interim individually rational if all players on the 
market want to participate in the auction mechanism. That is to say that each 
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agent's interim expected utility from participating in the auction mechanism 
is higher than his or her expected utility of not participating in the auction 
(or outside option) at the interim stage. For the first case in which the seller 
also has a private information, the seller’s outside option is 





j B ss s s sU dF
n
. This implies that the seller 
has a valuation for the item, and her outside option at the interim stage is 
equal to interim expected utility of not entering into the auction, which 
depends on her information (or signal) and the priors of the buyers. Then, 
for our first case this axiom requires that for all s s ,  
0( ) ,0s s sU U               (4) 
and for all i B , and all i i ,  
0( ) 0.i i iU U                       (5) 
To understand the effects of outside options, we assume that the seller 
has no valuation for the item in the second case. Then, for the second case 
this axiom requires, for all auction participants { }j B s , and all j j ,  
0( ) 0.j j jU U               (6) 
This implies that the only difference between these two cases is about 
the seller's outside option. In the first case, the seller also has a valuation for 
the item and receives a partial information about the true value of the item. 
Note that true value of the item is estimated just by using the information 
structure of the market and the degree of informational externalities for all 
agents. In the second case, the seller does not receive any signal about the 
real value of item, and hence her valuation for the item is normalized to 
zero.  
An auction mechanism, ( , )y t , is ex-ante budget balanced if  
{ }
( ) ( ) 0.i
i B s
t dF              (7) 
We call an auction mechanism desirable if it satisfies the three axioms 
(incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance) stated 
above. 
3. Seller-optimal auctions 
An auction designer chooses a desirable auction mechanism which 
maximizes the seller’s net expected utility. Therefore, the auction designer 
maximizes 
( ) ( )
s
s
s s s sU dF               (8) 
subject to desirability conditions that we defined at the end of the previous 
section. We follow the familiar mathematical machinery from the 





mechanism design literature to solve this constrainted optimization problem, 
and to find a direct auction mechanism that maximizes the objective 
function in this section. Note that seller-optimal auction mechanisms are 
belong to a larger set of auction mechanisms which is called the set of ex-
ante efficient auction mechanisms. We also know that the set of interim 
efficient auction rules is larger than the set of ex-ante efficient auction rules. 
See Ledyard and Palfrey (1999), Perez-Nievas (2000), Ledyard and Palfrey 
(2007) and Küçükşenel (2012b) for more on a mathematical description of 
the set of interim efficient mechanisms for different mechanism design 
environments. See also Kajii and Ui (2009) for extension of interim efficient 
allocations to environments under uncertainty, and Hahn and Yannelis 
(1997) for more on different efficiency concepts for Bayesian environments. 
The current paper complements these papers, related to a description of the 
set of interim efficient or optimal auctions, by explicitly studying the effects 
of outside options on seller-optimal auctions. The steps for the complete 
description of the seller optimal auctions are very similar to the steps in the 
description of interim efficient auctions and to the steps in the description of 
optimal auctions for the private-value auction settings. Therefore, we follow 
the usual steps in the literature to find a solution to the stated constrainted 
optimization problem. Thus, the general mathematical structure of seller-
optimal auction mechanisms in this class of Bayesian environments is not 
very surprising. However, we provide the characterization in this section for 
the completeness of the paper. Our main contribution is to highlight and 
prove the effects of different specifications of outside options on seller-
optimal auction outcomes, and hence sale decisions. 
Interim incentive compatibility requires that none of the agents can 
obtain a strictly higher payoff by individually lying about his or her type 
given that the other agents report their types truthfully. Let for all 
{ }i B s , ( )( ) ( )
i
i
i i i i
i
vQ dF . For all incentive compatible 
mechanisms, we need to have ( )i iQ  is monotone increasing, and for all 
i i  
( ) ( ) ( ) .
i
i
i i i i iU U Q a da                    (9) 
This characterization of the set of incentive compatible mechanisms 
and the proof for this result are well-known in the mechanism design 
literature, and similar to the environments without informational 
externalities. Rochet (1987) provides a complete proof for independent 
quasi-linear environments. 
Interim individual rationality for both cases requires that for all i B , 
and all i i  




0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
i
i
i i i i i i i i iU U U Q a da U ,      (10) 
and for the seller, and all s s  
0 0
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )





ss s s ss s s s
ss s s s
sU U U Q a da Q a da U
U Q a da U
  (11) 
The worst type of a buyer is her lowest possible type, i , and hence 
individual rationality condition reduces to ( ) 0i iU  for a buyer in both 
cases since ( )i iQ is non-decreasing. For the seller, we need to consider two 
different cases. In both cases the worst type of the seller is her highest 
possible type, s . This is because individual rationality condition for both 
cases requires that 0( ) ( ) 0s s ssU U . For the first case in which the 
outside option of the seller is { }0 (1 ) ((
1
) )( ) 0
s
j
j B ss s s sU dF
n
, the 
requirement of the individual rationality condition for the seller is 
0( ) ( ) ( ) 0
s
s
sss s sU Q a da U  for all s s (Equation 11). This 
inequality holds for all possible types of the seller only if 
0 0min{ ( ) ( ) ( )} ( ) ( ) 0
s
s
ss s s s s ss sU Q a da U U U . For the 
second case, the outside option of the seller is 0 ( ) 0sU , it is easy to see 
that individual rationality condition for all possible types of the seller is 
satisfied if ( ) 0
ssU  since the worst type of the seller is her highest 
possible type in this environment. Therefore, the individual rationality 
constraint can be binding for the lowest possible type of a buyer and/or for 
the highest possible type of the seller. These necessary and sufficient 
conditions for our initial constraints can now be used in the original 
optimization problem.  
As stated at the beginning of this section, the auction designer’s aim is 
to find the seller-optimal auction subject to the desirability constraints. The 
Lagrangian function for this optimization problem using the above results 
can be written as 





s s s s i i i s s s s s
s s
i B
F Q dF B y t U U U
f
  (12) 
In the 12th equation, ( , )B y t  represents the expected budget surplus; 
the constants , i  and s  represent the Lagrangian multipliers 
respectively for the ex-ante budget balance condition, a buyer i’s individual 





rationality constraint, and the seller’s individual rationality constraint. The 
first order conditions for this maximization problem imply that the budget 
balance constraint is always binding, and hence ( , ) 0B y t . This result is 
due to the fact that 1 since the multipliers for individual rationality 
constraints are nonnegative, and 1 s . Up to now, we have ignored 
one of the requirements for incentive compatibility condition, ( )i iQ is 
monotone increasing. Using the same idea in Myerson (1981), we call our 
main optimization program as a regular problem if this monotonicity 
condition is not binding. That is, the solution without considering the 
monotonicity requirement is also a solution to our initial optimization 
problem. Given the above results, we can convert our maximization problem 
to a more familiar one that works with virtual valuations by substituting the 
modified constraints to our initial objective function. That is, an auction 
mechanism ( , )y t  is a seller-optimal auction if and only if the auction 
outcome rule, y , solves the following maximization problem, 
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ),i i s s
y Y i B
max y W dF y W dF        (13) 






i i i s s s
i i s s
i i i s s s
i B
v F v Fy v y v dF
f f
    (14) 
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )0 ( 1)( [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )),
(
( ) ( )]
) ( )
i i i s s s
i i s s
i i i s s s
i B
v F v Fy v y v dF
f f
    (15) 
where we denote ( , )iW as the modified virtual valuation of a buyer 
i B ; 
{ } 1 ( ) 1( , ) (1 ) ,
1 1 ( )
j i i




      (16) 
and ( , )sW as the modified virtual valuation of the seller for the first case; 
{ } 1 1 ( )( , ) (1 ) 1 .
11 ( )
j s s




    (17) 
Notice that ( , ) 0sW  for the second case. The solution to this 
problem can be stated in a more familiar way. In the seller-optimal auction, 
the seller keeps the good if there is no buyer with positive modified virtual 
valuation which is higher than the modified virtual valuation of the seller. 
Otherwise, a buyer gets the good. Thus, any agent { }i B s  such that 
,{ ( , ) max{0, ( , ),max ( , )}}
i s k
k i k si argmax W W W  gets the auctioned 
item. The structure of the solution is similar to the structure of optimal 
auctions in private value environments. As in Myerson (1981), we need to 




work with virtual valuations. However, these virtual valuations are modified 
due to informational externalities and desirability conditions. We find this 
solution for the regular problems. A standard simple sufficient condition, 
which also guarantees that the monotonicity condition is not binding in our 
environment, is to assume that modified virtual valuations are monotone 
increasing in type.  
Given this general mathematical structure of the seller-optimal 
auctions, we next show that comparative statics results that examine the 
impact of a change in the degree of informational externalities in 
preferences, , on seller-optimal auction outcomes depend on different 
specifications of the seller’s outside option for our two different cases. We 
can actually show for the first case that as the auction setting merges to the 
standard private-value auction setting, the seller sells the private good more 
often in the seller-optimal auction. However, the relationship between the 
degree of informational externalities and sale decisions in the seller-optimal 
auctions is ambiguous for the second case. The next result summarizes these 
findings. 
Proposition 1: The relationship between the degree of informational 
externalities and sale decisions in the seller-optimal auctions depends on the 
way of specification of outside options in two different cases. 
Proof: For the first case, suppose the seller sells the good in ( , )  to 
the buyer i in the seller-optimal auction. Then, 
1 ( ) 1 ( )( ( 1) ) ( , ) 0.
( 1) ( ) ( )
1 i i s si s




Let without loss of generality . Then, the seller also sells the 
good in ( , ) , since ( , ) ( , )i s . This is true 
independent of the seller's individual rationality constraints. Now, suppose 
the seller does not sell the good in ( , )  and let i B a buyer with the 
highest private signal, i j for all ,i j B . Then ( , )i s .  
However, it is easy to see that there exist (0,1)  and  such that 
( , ) i s and ( , )i s , which implies that the seller sells 
the good in ( , ) . Therefore, the seller sells the good more often in the 
seller-optimal auction when  increases. Note that if the individual 
rationality constraint is binding for the seller, and she does not sell the good 
in ( , ( , ))s s , she will also not sell it in ( )), ( ,s s . This implies that 
 and sale decisions are positively correlated for the first case. We provide 
examples in the next section to prove that the relationship is ambiguous for 
the second case. This will complete the proof by showing that the 
relationship depends on outside options.  
 The idea behind the result for the first case is that the seller's 
valuation becomes more interdependent with the buyers’ valuations, and 





the ratio of information profiles where sale is profitable decreases as  
decreases. Küçükşenel (2012a) has established the same result for all 
interim efficient mechanisms for the first case. Therefore, an identical 
result and intuition holds for all interim efficient auction mechanisms for 
the first case if valuation functions are linear in auction outcomes, which 
is the case in this environment. See, Küçükşenel (2012a) for more details 
on this and on the set of all interim efficient auction mechanisms for 
more general environments with allocative and informational 
externalities.  
4. Numerical examples 
In this section, we complete the proof of Proposition 1 for the second 
case by providing an example for our auction design environment. This 
result shows that an auction designer should be careful when modelling the 
outside options which is the main topic of this paper. The following 
examples are also used to explicitly show the difference between two cases. 
Suppose that there are four agents (3 buyers and a seller), and we are 
in the first case. Then, the valuation functions have the following form: 
{ }( ) (1 ) .
4
j
j B si iv          (18) 
We also assume that ~j Uniform[0,1] for each agent { }j B s . 
Therefore, modified virtual valuations are equivalent to 
1 2 3 1( , ) (1 ) ( )( 1) ,
4 4
s
i i iW    (19) 
1 2 3 1( , ) (1 ) ( )( ) .
4 4
s s
s s sW    (20) 
Now, fix a type profile * 1 2 3( , , , ) (0.4,0.8,0.7,0.5)s . Note that 
the seller's individual rationality constraint is not binding for this 
information structure. The following table shows the modified virtual 
valuations of all agents for different degrees of informational externalities:  
Table 1 
Optimal Auction, Modified Virtual Valuations and Trade 
 *( , )sW  1 *( , )W  2 *( , )W  3 *( , )W  Trade 
0 0.6 0.55 0.53 0.48 No, s keeps the item 
0.1 0.58 0.56 0.51 0.43 No, s keeps the item 
0.5 0.5 0.58 0.46 0.24 Yes, 1 wins 
0.75 0.45 0.59 0.43 0.12 Yes, 1 wins 
1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0 Yes, 1 wins 




As the above table suggests, for a given profile there is a certain cut 
off value for  after which the trade starts to occur. If we repeat the same 
process for all possible profiles, we can conclude that the seller sells the 
good more often in the seller optimal auction as the auction setting merges 
to the standard private-value auction setting for our first case. The above 
example explicitly shows the main idea for the first case. 
Now, suppose that the seller has no valuation for the item (the 
valuation functions and priors are identical to the example above), and hence 
we are in the second case. In this case, the above observation may no longer 
be true since the seller's valuation is no longer interdependent with the 
buyers’ valuations (i.e., ( ) 0sv ). If the seller has zero value for the item, 
the analysis requires only slight changes to modified virtual valuations. The 
modified virtual valuations for this case can be written as follows: 
1 2 3 1( , ) (1 ) ( )( 1) ,
3 3
i i iW       (21) 
( , ) 0.sW                                                                       (22) 
Now, fix a type profile 1 2 3( , , ) (0.4,0.3,0.2) . The following 
table shows the modified virtual valuations of all agents for different degrees 
of informational externalities: 
Table 2 
Optimal Auction, Modified Virtual Valuations and Trade When The Seller 
Has No Valuation for the Auctioned İtem 
 *( , )sW  1 *( , )W  2 *( , )W  3 *( , )W  Trade 
0 0 0.1 0.07 0.03 Yes, 1 wins 
0.1 0 0.03 0.02 -0.03 Yes, 1 wins 
0.5 0 -0.05 -0.17 -0.28 No, s keeps the item 
0.75 0 -0.13 -0.28 -0.44 No, s keeps the item 
1 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 No, s keeps the item 
 
The seller sells the good only if max{ ( , ) | } 0iW i B . The 
relationship between the degree of informational externalities (or different 
environments) and the probability of trade depends on whether 
max{ ( , ) | }iW i B  is increasing or decreasing in . It is easy to see that 
the sign of max{ ( , ) | }
iW i B  depends on priors. This implies that it is 
impossible to get a general comparative statics result for the second case. In 
this example, the seller sells the good less often in the optimal auction as  
increases given . We cannot get a general result for the second 
environment because the ratio of type profiles in which the highest virtual 
valuation is decreasing in  depends on priors. Note that in the above 





example the modified virtual valuation of buyer one is decreasing in  
given . This implies that it is possible to construct an example in which 
the highest virtual valuation changes sign from negative to positive or 
positive to negative. Therefore, the correlation between auction outcomes 
and the degree of informational externalities, , is ambiguous (or depends 
on the set of possible priors) for the second case.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we review the mathematical description of the set of 
seller-optimal auctions for auction design environments with pure 
informational externalities using familiar tools of the conventional 
mechanism design literature. We show that seller-optimal auction rules 
choose an auction outcome that maximizes the total of modified virtual 
valuations in this auction design environment with pure informational 
externalities. Our main finding is that the correlation between the degree of 
informational externalities and sale decisions depends on different 
specifications of the seller's outside option. We also provide numerical 
examples to explicitly show the intuition behind this result. Extension of this 
result to more general environments without the specific assumptions about 
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Dış seçeneklerin optimal ihale sonuçlarına etkisi 
Bu makalede, enformasyonel dışsallıklar içeren ihale tasarımı problemleri için satıcı-
optimal ihale kuralları tanımlanmaktadır ve dış seçeneklerin bu ihale kuralları sonuçları üzerine 
olan etkisi incelenmektedir. Eğer satıcının dış seçeneği içsel ve piyasanın enformasyon durumuna 
bağlı ise, ihale standart özel-değer ihale ortamına yaklaştıkça satıcının ihale edilen malı daha sık 
sattığı gösterilmektedir. Eğer satıcının dış seçeneği piyasanın enformasyon durumuna bağlı değil 
ise, enformasyonel dışsallık derecesi ile satış kararları arasındaki bağlantı belirsizdir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İhale tasarımı, enformasyonel dışsallık, dış seçenekler. 
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